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Abstract.  Within   the   debate   about   developing   countries   export   competitiveness   the   increasing  
importance  of food  safety  and  quality  standards  especially in OECD countries appeals to be one of  
the major  sources of concern. The paper analyses the trade  performance  of 73 developing  countries  
within  the  context  of  stricter  SPS measures.  The  analysis  concentrates  on  the  meat  and  fruit/  
vegetable  sectors as especially high  value  product  sectors are determined  by standards. The periods  
under  consideration  are 1993- 1995,  as a period  before  the  implementation  of the  SPS Agreement  
and  2002- 2004,  as  a  period  after  the  implementation.  A  cluster  analysis  groups  the  countries  
according  to the  variables "ratio" and  "difference" of the  export  value  to OECD countries including  
the  possibility  to explore  trade  performance  regarding  to the  absolute  level of change  and  relative  
dynamics.  Subsequently,  interconnections  with  EU and  US border  rejections  as well as with  STDF 
(Standards  and  Trade  Development  Facility) investment  are  explored.  For the  results  three  major  
findings  should  be  underlined: e) The  group  of developing  countries  shows  as well in total  as in  
relative  terms  a  very  heterogeneous  picture  of  their  export  development  and  there  is no  linear  
relation  between  total export  value  and  direction  of development.  ee) Ten  groups  were identified  in  
the cluster analysis, like e.g. small winners, large winners, small losers, large losers. eee) Most large  
exporters  increased  their  market  share,  but  very  successful  groups  were  also found  among  small  
exporters,  especially  in the  fruit/  vegetable  market.  eeee) Both, border  rejections  as well as STDF 
investments  did not reflect a particular structure  related  to market  share  development  of individual  
countries.
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1 Introduction
In   the   current   debate   about   better   market   access   for   and   the   competitiveness   of 
developing  countries’ agricultural  exports  two  common  perspectives  are prevailing. The 
one   is   the  "standard   as  a   barrier"  perspective,   and   the   other   is   the  perspective   of 
developing  countries  as  "standard  takers".  Both  points  of views  imply  that  developing  
countries  have to adjust  to developed  countries  standards  and  that  they  thereby  are the  
specific  "losers"  of  higher  standards  in  agricultural  trade.  While  the  number  of  WTO 
notifications   underlines   the   latter   perspective   (only   one   third   of   the   sanitary   and  
phytosanitary   (SPS)  notifications   come   from   developing   countries)   little   empirical  
evidence  exists  about  the  former.  In literature  standards  are  commonly  seen  as a trade  
impeding   factor   for   developing   countries’   exports.   Several   case   studies   analyze   the  
impact  of higher  SPS measures  on trade  flows  of individual  developing  countries  export  
sectors [1, 21, 12, 5, 6]. However, little research  exists  which  could  lead to a more  differentiated  
perspective   of   the   impact   of   higher   SPS  measures   among   the   group   of   developing  
countries.  Recent  literature [21, 9, 18] starts  to resolve the strict  perspective of standards  as a 
trade  barrier. More emphasis  is put  on the heterogeneous  effects  of standards  which  can 
act like a catalyst  and  like a barrier  at the  same  time. The effect  depends  mainly  on  the  
ability   of   the   individual   country   to   comply   with   the   standard   and   to   prove   this 
compliance  to  its  trading  partners.  But which  are  the  countries  that  perform  well and  
which  countries  end  up to be even more  marginalized?  
The objective  of the  paper  is to shed  more  light  on  the  question  which  countries  might  
be positively  or negatively  affected  by higher  SPS measures.  Hence,  the  paper  analyses  
the  development  of exports  of 73  developing  countries  to  the  OCED countries  (which 
were perceived  as the most  important  standard  setters) between  two time  spans  – before  
and  after  the  implementation  of the  SPS Agreement.  The  analysis  concentrates  on  two  
commodity  groups  that  are  strongly  influenced  by  standards  -  fruit/  vegetable  and  
2meat. As the number  of SPS notifications  as such  is likely a conservative  indicator  of the  
effects  of SPS measures  on trade  flows [18] two indicators  were chosen  and  tested  for their  
ability to reflect  the  increasing  importance  of standards  on developing  countries’ export  
performance.  First,  rejections  each  country  faced  for  its  agricultural  exports  at  the  EU 
and   the   US  borders   and,   second,   the   investment   in   the   food   safety   sector   by   the  
Standard   and   Trade   Development   Facility   (STDF),   which   aims   at   strengthening  
developing  countries’ SPS capacity. 
Even  though  standards  are  only  one  aspect  among  multiple  factors  influencing  trade  
performance  of developing  countries  we put  them  in the  focus  of the  interpretation  of 
the analysis  of the trade  data. 
The  paper  has  the  following  structure.  Overall, it is divided  in two  major  blocks.  The 
first   part  describes  the   standards  environment  starting   in  section  2  with   a  general 
overview  of sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures  and  the  WTO Agreement  on  Sanitary  
and   Phytosanitary   Standards.   Following,   section   3   explores   the  development  of  SPS 
measures  in  the  agricultural  trading  environment  looking  at  the  development  of  SPS 
notifications   to   the   WTO,   WTO   trade   concerns   and   WTO   disputes   related   to   SPS 
measures  as  well as  border  rejections  of the  EU and  the  US and  STDF investments  in 
various   developing  countries.  The   second   major  part   of   the   paper   is   the   empirical  
exploration  of  developing  countries’  export  performance  of  their  fruit/  vegetable  and  
meat  products  to OECD countries.  Section  4 provides  a description  of the  methodology  
and  the  data.  Section  5 starts  with  a brief  description  of general  trends  in agricultural  
trade,  followed  by  a detailed  discussion  of  the  results  of  the  two  cluster  analysis.  In 
section   6,   the   results   of   the   cluster   analysis   are   related   to   border   rejections   and  
investments  of the STDF. In section  7 conclusions  and  a future  outlook  are drawn. 
2 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, what are they, why 
are they imposed and how are they regulated? 
Sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures  are  a sub  category  of  non  tariff  barriers  (NTB).1 
They   are   applied   as  regulations   and   standards   governing   the   sale   of   products   into  
national markets  that have  as their prima  objective the correction  of market  inefficiencies  
stemming   from   externalities   associated   with   the   production,   distribution,   and  
consumption  of  these  products [17:3]. SPS measures  consequently  have  the  objective  to 
prevent   the   entry   of   products   into   domestic   markets   which   fail   to   meet   required  
standards   and   to   protect   domestic   suppliers   and   consumers   interests.   The   SPS 
Agreement  defines  SPS measures  as  regulations  adopted  by a nation  to protect  human,  
animal,  or  plant  life  and  health  from  certain  enumerated  biological  and  toxicological  
risks [17:5].2 
SPS measures  show  a heterogeneous  nature,  as  they  consist  of  various  laws,  decrees, 
regulations,  requirements  and  procedures  which  are related  to food  safety. SPS measures  
differ  among  countries  because  of different  tasks,  diets,  income  levels  and  perceptions  
influencing  the  tolerance  of  a population  towards  food  safety  and  agricultural  health  
risks [9]. 
The   intention   to   create   an   international   agreement   mainly   came   from   the   general  
development  of international  trade  negotiations.  As tariffs  had  to  be  lowered  and  the 
use  of other  traditional  trade  barriers  was eliminated  there  was a concern  that  technical  
measures  such  as sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures  could  be used  in order  to replace  
traditional  protectionist  measures  [10]. As a consequence,  their  use  and  application  was 
regulated  in the  SPS Agreement.  The agreement  is now  in force  for  developed  countries  
for 10 years, for developing  countries  for 8 years  and  for least  developed  countries  for 5 
years. The SPS Agreement  allows  governments  to implement  border  measures  relating  to 
human,  animal   and   plant   life   or   health   on   the   level   of   sanitary   and   phytosanitary  
protection  it  regards  appropriate.  Nevertheless,  the  agreement  tries  to  minimize  the  
trade  distorting  effects  of any SPS measure  by encouraging  countries  to use international  
standards  as a base  for their  policies. 3 Two main  principles  of the  SPS Agreement  are 1) 
1  Hillman  (1996)  defines  non  tariff  barriers  as  all government  measures,  other  than  tariffs  or  
customs  taxes  which  restrict  or distort  international  trade  between  domestic  and  imported  goods  
and  services. 
2 All other  measures  of food  regulations  and  standard  are  defined  as technical  barriers  to  trade  
and  regulated  in the Agreement  on Technical Barriers  to Trade  (TBT).
3 The international  standard  setting  organizations  are the Codex Alimentarius  (on food  safety), the 
International  Office  of  Epizootics  (on  animal  health  and  zoonoses),  and  the  Secretariat  of  the  
3the  principle  of   justification  and  2)  the  principle  of   transparency.  The  principle  of 
scientific justification  implies  that  SPS measures  which are stricter  than  the international  
guidelines  have  to  be  based  on  scientific  justifications.  The  principle  of  transparency  
obligates  that  trading  partners  have to be notified  of all changes  in SPS measures  which  
could   affect   trade   either   in   a   positive   or   in   a   negative   manner.   Countries   have   to 
establish  national  Enquiry  Points,  where  trading  partners  have  the  possibility  to receive 
information   concerning   all   food   safety   regulations   of   the   country   and   national  
notification   authorities   which   are   in   force   to   implement   all   notification   procedures  
required  in the  SPS Agreement.  Figure 1 depicts  the  number  of WTO members  among  
LDCs, DCs and  OECD countries  (shown  as  lines). The  bars  depict  the  number  of those  
countries  which  notified  either  an  Enquiry  Point  (EQP) or/and  a Notification  Authority  
(NNA). 
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As   can   be   seen   in   Figure 1,   all   OECD   countries   reported   an   Enquiry   Point   and   a 
Notification  Authority  by 1997.  In contrast,  it took  a much  longer  time  period  for many  
developing  countries  especially  for  the  LDC countries  to  comply  with  the  transparency  
requirements  of the  SPS Agreement.  In 2001, 25 out  of 140  members,  including  15 LDCs 
had  not  jet  registered  an  Enquiry  Point  and  32, including  17 LDCs had  not  registered  a 
Notification   Authority.   In   2004,   only   4   developing   countries   had   not   registered   an 
Enquiry  Point  but  still 11 LDCs had  not  jet fulfilled  the  requirement.  Still, 23 developing  
countries  had  not  registered  a Notification  Authority  including  15  LDCs. In May 2005  
139  out  of  148  members  (94%) had  notified  their  Enquiry  Point  and  130  (87%) had  
identified  their  national  Notification  Authority [30]. Even though  developing  countries  had  
a longer  time  span  to  implement  the  requirements  of the  agreement  one  other  reason  
for  the  time  lag of developing  countries  in fulfilling  the  SPS Agreement  however  might  
be  found  in  their  rare  participation  in  the  SPS Committees  meetings.  Until  2001  43 
developing  countries  did not  attend  to any of the official meetings [13]. 
The  SPS Agreement  pays  attention  to  the  specific  situation  of developing  countries  in 
particular  with  respect  to its implementation  periods  and  in the obligation  of developed  
countries  to  provide  technical  assistance  to  developing  countries.  The  SPS Secretariat  
circulated  two  questionnaires  among  developing  countries  in the  years  1999  and  2001  
regarding  the  needs  of developing  countries  for technical  assistance.  In September  2002  
the Standards  and  Trade  Development  Facility was established 4 to coordinate  the efficient  
use  of  resources  in  SPS related  activities  and  thus  enhance  developing  countries’  SPS 
capacity. 
There  has  already  been  five years  experience  with  the  SPS Agreement  when  the  Doha 
round   started   in   2001   in   Qatar.   The   new   negotiations   had   been   supposed   to   take  
especially developing  countries’ needs  into account.  Even though  SPS measures  had  such  
a   high   relevance   for   international   agricultural   trade   and   developing   countries   in 
particular  had  large concerns  about  these  measures  affecting  their trade  competitiveness  
International  Plant Protection  Convention  (on plant  health).
4  The   STDF   was   established   by   the   Food   and   Agriculture   Organization   (FAO),   the   World 
Organization  for  Animal  Health  (OIE), the  World  Bank, the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO) and  
the World Trade  Organization  (WTO).
4neither  the SPS nor the TBT Agreement  have been  accepted  as a matter  of negotiation  on 
the   agenda.   Josling   et   al.   (2003)   explore   that   developing   countries   claimed   a   more  
stringent  application  of the agreements  in particular  with §9, which  specifies  the duty  of 
developed   countries   for   technical   and   financial   support   to   developing   countries   in 
complying  with the requirements  of the agreement  and  to adapt  their agricultural  export  
sector  to the required  SPS measures.  
3 The   Evolution   of   SPS   Measures   in   the   Agricultural 
Multilateral Trading System 
This  section  explores  the  extent  to which  food  and  agricultural  products  are subject  to 
SPS  measures   and   other   technical   measures   regulating   food   safety   concerns.   The 
increasing   importance   of   SPS   measures   can   be   read   from   three   types   of   WTO 
mechanisms:  notifications,  trade  concerns 5 and  dispute  settlements.  Additionally, border  
rejections  and  STDF investment  express  the  importance  of food  safety  for  agricultural  
trade  flows.
A total  amount  of 4375  notifications  has  been  circulated  since  the  release  of the  SPS 
Agreement  (as of May 2005) not  including  corrigenda,  addenda  and  revisions [30]. 
Figure 2: Number of notifications  of SPS measures  to the WTO, 1995- 2004  
Source: own illustration,  [26, 28, 30] 
Figure  2 depicts  the increasing  annual  number  of notifications  since the  implementation  
of   the   agreement.   Annual   notifications   more   than   tripled,   from   less   than   200 
notifications  in 1995  to a total number  of 617 in 2005. Only 59% of all members  notified  
at least  one  notification  since  1995  and  nearly  half of all notifications  over  the  last  ten  
years  came  either  from  the  US or from  the  EU[30]. While in 1995  nearly  all notifications  
came  from  the OECD countries  developing  countries  now contribute  at least  one quarter  
to today's  SPS notifications [13]. 
Between  2000  and  2003  more  than  50% of the  notifications  were reported  in the  area  of 
food  safety  (the  major  share  are notification  of maximum  residue  levels). Second  ranks  
the  issue  of danger  to human  health  from  animal  or plant  carried  diseases  followed  by 
plant  protection  and  animal  health [28, 29, 30]. 
Second, the increasing  importance  of SPS measures  for international  trade  is depicted  by 
the number  of trade  concerns  raised  within  the SPS committee  meetings. Trade  concerns  
make   it   possible   for   countries   to   attract   attention   and   initiate   discussion   about   a 
particular  concern.  Since the implementation  of the  SPS Agreement  altogether  204  trade  
concerns  were  raised  until  2004 [30]. Only  56  trade  concerns  have  been  reported  to  be 
resolved  in  the  total  period.  More  than  40% of  the  trade  concerns  where  related  to 
animal  health  and  zoonoses,  followed  by 29% for plant  health  and  27% for  food  safety.  
During   the   indicated   period   143   times   developed   countries   raised   specific   trade  
concerns,  followed  by 101  cases  of developing  countries  trade  concerns.  Only two least-
developed  countries  raised  specific trade  concerns [31]. 
Third,  in cases  where  negotiations  have  not  succeeded  in resolving  trade  disputes  the 
WTO dispute  settlement  procedures  are  invoked.  The panel  judges  the  compliance  of a 
specific SPS measure  with  the  SPS Agreement.  More than  300  disputes  have been  raised  
under  the WTO dispute  settlement  system,  of which  30 referred  to the SPS Agreement [30]. 
In  20  panels  both  countries  have  been  OECD countries.  Only  in  two  cases  no  OECD 
5  Trade   concerns   are   trade   problems   between   members  which   are   discussed   within   the   SPS 







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004country  was involved. From  the total amount  of 30 SPS disputes  12 have been  raised  to a 
panel. In all dispute  panel cases  OECD countries  are involved [30]. 
Fourth,   the   increasing   importance   of   food   safety   is   reflected   in   border   rejections.  
Information  about  border  rejections  related  to food  safety  and  health  concerns  is rare. 
Generally, data  are only available for the EU and  the US and  unfortunately  do not  specify 
value or volume  of the rejected  quantity. Data for the EU are available since 2001  but  for 
the US only for 2005/06.  
The  EU border  rejections  where  available  since  the  introduction  of  the  Rapid  Alert  
System  for Food  and  Feed (RASFF), which  was implemented  in 2001. The RASFF collects  
two  different  types  of  information.  First,  alert  notifications  which  relate  to  products  
which  are  already  on  the  market  and  which  present  a risk  to  the  consumer.  Second,  
information  notifications  relating  to products  presenting  a risk  to the  consumer  but  are 
not  (yet) on the market  or for which the risk is limited. 













Source: own illustration,  [14, 15, 16]
Like depicted  in Figure  3, the  number  of total  information  exchanges  increased  strongly  
from  698  in 1999  to 5562  in 2004 [16] . In 2004  more  than  63% of the  alert  notifications  
originated  within  the  EU, while 79% of the  information  notifications  originated  in third  
countries.  The number  of alert  notifications  rose  during  the  time  period  from  only 97 in 
1999  to 691  in 2004.  Additionally, information  notifications  increased  during  the  same  
time  from  263  to  more  1897.  The  product  group  with  highest  numbers  of  alert  or 
information  notifications  during  the  time  between  2000  and  2004  was  nuts  and  nut  
products  with  in average  404  notifications  per  year,  followed  by fish,  crustaceans  and  
mollusks   (392),  meat   (173)   and   fruits   and   vegetables   (161) [14,   15,   16].  The   most   often  
notified  third  countries  between  2002  and  2004  are  Iran  with  1049  notifications  and  
China   with   443   notifications,   followed   by   Brazil   (326),   India   (290),   Thailand   (275), 
Indonesia  (147) and  Argentina  (99) [14, 15, 16]. 
For  US border  rejections  data  availability  is  even  more  limited.  An  Import  Refusals  
Report  (IRR) only exists  since  March  2005 6. Also, the  IRR does  not  include  certain  meat  
and  poultry  products.  Nevertheless,  Henson  and  Jaffee  (2004)  underline  that  border  
rejections  for  food  and  feed  increased  tremendously  in  the  US. The  most  important  
agricultural   product   groups   for  border   rejections   are   fishery  and  seafood   products  
followed  by  fruits  and  vegetables.  From  the  available  data,  the  most  often  notified  
country  in the  fruit/  vegetable  sector  (including  only the  group  of non  OECD Countries) 
is by far  Mexico  with  886  notifications,  followed  by the  Dominican  Republic  with  366 
and  China  with  357  notifications.  With a large gap  these  countries  are followed  by India 
(153), Thailand  (78) and  the  Philippines  (65). Similarly to the  EU border  detentions  most  
notifications   come   from   very   few   countries.   The   US   notifications   include   with  
Bangladesh  only one  LDC country  and  only three  countries  from  Sahara  or Sub- Saharan  
Africa (Ghana, Cameroon  and  Ethiopia). 
To  provide  an  order  of  magnitude  in  which  world  trade  with  agro- food  products  is 
affected  from  border  detentions  Henson  and  Jaffee  (2004) estimate  an  amount  of $ 3.8 
billion for the time  period  between  2000- 2001  (the estimate  is based  on official data  and  
consultations  with  private  traders).  Even  though  they  underline  that  this  estimate  is 
probably  an  overestimation  as the  authors  have  assumed  similar  levels  of rejection  for 
developed  countries  and  developing  countries  it still provides  a rough  idea. 
Finally, as a last  indicator  donor  investment  in food  safety  issues  is explored.  The STDF 
is at  the  same  time  a financing  and  a coordination  mechanism.  It provides  grants  for 
6 Border  rejections  on agricultural  products  fall under  the  responsibility  of the  US Food  and  Drug  
Administration.  Data  about  US border  detentions  were  published  on  the  FDA's  homepage  in  a 
monthly  scaling [20] in the Import  Refusals  Report  (IRR). 
6developing  countries  in  order  to  comply  with  SPS standards  and  hence  increase  or 
maintain  their  market  access.  Until August  2003  (which  is the  last  online  update  of the  
STDF database)  funding  was  granted  to  151  different  developing  countries,  46  of them  
are LDCs. Only three  LDCs did not  receive a grant, Somalia, Haiti and  Timor  Lesté. 
The total grants  amounted  to more  than  $ 8.5 billion. Kenya is with more  than  $ 3 billion  
by far the  top  receiving country  of STDF grants,  followed  by Iran  (649 million), Pakistan  
(410  million) and  the  two  LDC countries  Nepal  (371  million)  and  Bhutan  (386  million). 
Nevertheless,  25 LDCs rank  on the  end  of the  countries  list with  total  grants  lower  than  
$ 20 thousand.  
In chapter  6 data  on border  rejections  and  STDF investments  will be analyzed  in relation  
with the export  performance  of countries. 
4 Methodology and Data
The previous  sections  explained  the  importance  of standards.  The remaining  part  of the  
paper  empirically analyses  patterns  of developing  countries’ performance  in agricultural  
exports  and  possible  links  between  export  performance  and  standards.
The analysis  is based  on  trade  data  of 73 7 developing  countries  taken  from  the  PC-TAS 
data  base [8]. To  describe  the  development  of  developing  countries’  trade  performance  
and  its  relation  to  standards,  data  on  export  values  of two  commodity  groups  for  two 
time  spans  is collected:  meat  and  fruits/  vegetables  in the  years  1993- 1995  (before  the  
SPS Agreement)  and  2002- 2004  (after  the  SPS Agreement).  Exports  to  OECD countries  
are  selected  since  these  countries  are  seen  as  “standard  setters” 8. The  sectors  of meat  
and  fruit/  vegetable  are chosen  because  these  markets  are highly affected  by standards.  
For  reasons  of  better  data  quality,  imports  of  OECD countries  from  each  developing  
country  are used  to describe  developing  countries’ exports.  
For  the  statistical  analysis,  four  variables  have  been  developed  describing  the  export  
performance  of the  individual  country 9, the  "average", the  "ratio", the  "difference"  and  
the "coefficient  of variation". All of them  are explained  as follows: 
In a first  step,  the average  export  values  of the individual  country  are calculated  for two  
time  periods  1993- 1995  and  2002- 2004.  In a second  step,  two  variables  are  calculated  
from  the  average  trade  values:  the  “ratio”  and  the  “difference”.  The  ratio  takes  into 
account  the  average  value  of exports  for the respective  commodity  group  in 1993- 1995  
and  2002- 2004.  It describes  the  dynamics  of  export  performance  without  taking  into 
consideration  the  absolute  level. However, it must  be noted  that  the  ratio  is sensitive  to 
the  absolute  volume  of trade,  since  e.g. a doubling  of exports  starting  from  a very low 
initial  value  is much  more  likely to  occur.  The  second  variable,  therefore  describes  the 
difference  between  the  average  value  of exports  for  the  respective  commodity  group  in 
1993- 1995  and  2002- 2004.  It takes  into  account  the  absolute  level  of  exports.  Thus  
especially   large   countries'   relatively   small   percentage   changes   in   export   value   are 
captured  better,  if looking  at  the  absolute  value.  Finally, the  coefficient  of variation  is 
calculated  for  the  period  2002- 2004  to  gain  an  idea  about  the  stability  of exports  of a 
country. It would  be interesting  to compare  the variability in the two time  spans,  but  the  
variable  has  several  missing  values  in the  first  period,  if single  years  are  not  reported  
and  therefore  would  reduce  the sample. 
These  variables  will be used  to group  countries  according  to their export  performance  in 
a cluster  analysis  (compare  section  5). The method  of cluster  analysis  can be used  for an 
exploratory,   empirical   classification   of   objects   according   to   their   similarity.   The 
objective  of  the  cluster  analysis  in  this  paper  is  to  identify  patterns,  or  groups,  of 
developments  in export  performance  across  countries.  The analysis  is conducted  for the  
7 84 developing  countries  – more  than  half of all -  were  not  included  in the  analysis  because  of a 
lack of data. 
8 In this  respect,  it would  be  interesting  to  compare  the  development  of exports  from  South  to 
North  with  those  from  South  to South, or from  South  to “East”, thus  in countries,  where  standards  
are not as strict. However, this was not analyzed  due  to lack of adequate  data.
9 Missing data  in PC-TAS were treated  as such. An alternative  would  be to treat  no trade  records  as 
a trade  volume  of 0 for  the  respective  pair  of trading  partners.  In our  approach  any country  with  
missing  data  in all years  of the  first  time  span  or  less  then  two  observations  in the  second  time  
span  is excluded  from  the  analysis.  We do  not  hurt  statistical  requirements  since  we do  not  deal  
with  a random  sample  anyway (which  is not  required  for cluster  and  factor  analysis). However, we 
slightly  overestimate  the  average  trade  value  and  slightly  underestimate  the  variation  in  trade  
volumes  for  countries  that  had  no  records  in single  years  of the  analysis.  This  only  affects  very 
small countries. Nevertheless,  it has the effect, that  only 17 LDCs were included  in the analysis.  
7two  commodity  groups  separately.  Of the  available  cluster  algorithms  this  paper  uses  
the  Ward  method  to  determine  the  number  of clusters  and  the  K-Means  algorithm  for 
the final partition. Clusters  will finally be interpreted  and  labeled.
To this  point,  analysis  is restricted  to the  trade  performance  of developing  countries  to 
OECD countries.  A positive  development  of the  trade  performance  in meat  and  fruits/  
vegetables  is interpreted  as an  indication  of successful  adjustment  to the  requirements  
posed  by standards  -  or at least  a compensation  of losses  arising  from  them.  However, 
data   interpretation   has   to   occur   carefully   since   trade   performance   has   several 
determinants  – a general  positive  trend  observed  in world  trade,  agricultural  growth  in 
developing  countries, price and  trade  policies, the ongoing  trend  of liberalization,  as well 
as  naturally  volatile  production  and  trade  volumes  – and  cannot  be fully attributed  to 
the effect of standards.  
To get  a clearer  idea  about  relations  with  standards,  additional  information  on  border  
rejections  and  donor  investments  are collected  (compare  section  3). This information  not  
only   captures   the   general   increase   in   importance   of   standards,   but   allows   to 
differentiate  between  countries: Which countries  have more  rejections  and  investments?  
Available  data  on  border  rejections  only  provide  a broad  picture  (compare  section  3). 
They are  limited  either  in terms  of yearly availability  (for the  EU they  are  only available 
since 2001) or in terms  of the reported  categories  (data  are either  classified  according  to 
the  products  country  of origin  or according  to  the  product  group).  Since EU rejections  
are  heavily determined  by meat  and  fruit/  vegetable  rejections  it seems  appropriate  to 
take  the  total  number  of rejections  notified  by country  into  account 10. In the analysis  we 
use  the  unweighted  border  rejections  from  the  EU and  the  US. Meaningful  weighting  is 
complicated  since  no  information  on  quantities  rejected  is  available  and  the  product  
groups  differ  or  might  be  very  specific  (e.g. nuts  in Iran). When  looking  at  results  for  
rejections  weighted  by the  export  quantity  of fruits  and  vegetables  no very clear  results  
were found.
The value  of investments  from  STDF (find  explanation  in section  3) in US$ is employed  
in the  analysis,  again  not  weighted  with  regard  to  the  trade  volume.  STDF investments  
are  limited  to  those  countries  that  receive  foreign  aid  at all so  in a developing  country  
sample  it can be used  without  a systematic  bias. It does  not  reflect, however, national  or 
private  investments  in the  upgrading  or setup  process  of the  national  safety  and  quality 
management.
5 Export performance of developing countries in meat and 
fruits/ vegetables -  patterns of winners and losers
Before  turning  to  the   formal   analysis  as   described  above,   we  will   briefly   introduce  
general developments  in agricultural  trade.
Even though  the  share  of agricultural  products  in total  merchandise  trade  is shrinking,  
international  exports  in agricultural  and  food  products  almost  doubled  between  1993  
and  2004.  The  traded  value  increased  from  nearly  340  billion  to  more  than  $  600 
billion [4]. The  share  of developing  countries’ agricultural  exports  in world  trade  is with 
around  30% relatively constant  in the  last  decade.  The average  share  of meat  and  fruit/  
vegetable  products  in total agricultural  trade  is 17.8% and  9.5% during  that  period [4].
The   markets   for   fruits/   vegetables   and   meat   have   a   specific   importance   for   many  
developing   countries.   Especially   fruits   and   vegetables   have   additionally   to   their  
economic  importance  a high  social  relevance  due  to  their  labor  intensity.  The  average  
share  of developing  countries  in these  two markets  ranged  from  35 to nearly 40% market  
share  in fruit/  vegetable  products  and  around  16- 18% for  meat  products  with  a slight  
upward  tendency  since 1998. 
Both sectors  are dominated  by only very few major  players. In the fruit/  vegetable  sector  
Mexico  and  China  already  count  for  30% of  all  OECD third  country  imports  in  the  
average  of the  years  2001- 2004.  This  is 5% more  than  during  the  time  period  between  
1993  and  1998.  Mexico and  China  are followed  by another  ten  countries  with  an export  
share  between  10 and  2%. This group  supplies  more  than  50% of the  OECD imports.  All 
other  developing  countries  have a share  of less  than  2% on total fruit/  vegetable  exports  
to OECD countries.  
10  The  only  other  groups  which  are  not  included  in  the  analysis,  but  are  important  sectors  for  
rejections,  are  fish  and  seafood  products.  With  respect  to  the  very  low quality  of data  fish  and  
seafood  products  have not been  included  in the analysis.
8Within  the meat  sector  the structure  is even more  concentrated.  Only Brazil supplies  38% 
of the  total OECD imported  meat  in the period  between  2001  and  2004. Brazil increased  
its  import  share  within  the  last  10  years  by more  than  12%. From  the  other  three  top  
players  China  and  Argentina  lost  tremendously  within  this  period  and  only  Thailand  
managed  as well to increase  its export  share. These  four  countries  alone  supplied  83% of 
developing  countries’ total  export  to the  OECD in the  last  decade.  No other  country  has  
an export  share  of more  than  5%. 
In  the  following  cluster  analysis  the  paper  goes  more  into  detail  with  this  analysis.  
Which   countries   are   winners   or   losers   concerning   their   export   performance?   The 
analysis  begins  with  the  cluster  analysis  of  the  fruit/  vegetable  sector  and  continues  
with  the  analysis  of the  meat  sector.  In general, it has  to be noted  that  for both  sectors,  
for  the  chosen  variables  (as described  in chapter  4) the  data  does  not  have  a perfectly 
clear  cluster  structure. 11 However,  of the  available  data  we regard  them  to  be  the  best  
indicators  of  export  performance.  The  exploratory  nature  of  cluster  analysis  possibly 
contradicts  our  assumptions  about  categories  like “winners”  and  “losers”  – their  might  
be groups  which  are  “similar”  in terms  of  the  distance  measure  in cluster  analysis  (in 
our  case  the  squared  Euclidian  distance), but  are  somewhat  difficult  to  interpret,  since  
they comprise  of both  slight  losers  and  slight  winners.  Since the cluster  analysis  requires  
choices  of the  user  at  different  steps,  we put  emphasis  on  distinguishing  “losers”  and  
“winners” as clearly as possible. 
The cluster  analysis  for fruits  and  vegetables  was performed  as follows: 
Four variables  where  considered  for clustering: 1) the  average  value of exports  (in 2002-
2004),  2) the  difference  of  the  export  values  between  the  two  periods,  3) the  ratio 
between  the  two periods,  and  4) the  coefficient  of variation.  For the  cluster  analysis  the  
total  sample  of 73  fruit/  vegetable  exporters  was  split  in two  groups,  small  and  large 
exporters.  This  decision  is based  on  two  different  reasons.  First,  the  “average”  and  the  
“difference”  are  highly  correlated  and  therefore  not  suitable  for  cluster  analysis.  This 
finding  alone  indicates  to  a pattern  of  more  successful,  large  exporters,  or  at  least  a 
systematic   proportional   increase   in   exports.   In   addition,   the   variable   “average”   is 
strongly  right  screwed  with  few large  exporters  and  many  rather  small  exporters.  As a 
consequence  the  variable  "average" was excluded  from  the  cluster  analysis  and,  instead,  
the  sample  was split  by the  threshold  of an average  of $ 500,000  thousand  according  to 
the observed  distribution.  Furthermore,  "Thailand" was excluded  from  the group  of large 
exporter  countries  since  it was found  in the  single linkage  clustering  as an outliner  and  
treated  as an additional  cluster. 
Cluster  analyses  were  conducted  separately  for  the  two  samples.  To gain  an  idea  about  
the  potential  number  of  clusters  the  Ward  procedure  was  used;  the  final  number  of 
clusters   was   determined   giving   higher   priority   to   “difference”   and   “ratio”   than   to 
“coefficient  of variation”.  Based  on  these  criteria,  a 5- cluster- solution  for  the  group  of 
59  small  exporters,  and  a 3- cluster- solution  for  the  group  of 13  large  exporters  were  
chosen.  These  solutions  were  further  checked  for homogeneity 12. The country  grouping  
is displayed  in Table  1. Clusters  are  numbered  consecutively  for  each  group,  starting  
from  1 for the small exporters  and  starting  from  10 for the large exporters.
 Table 1: Cluster membership  – fruit and vegetable  exports
11  This  became  clear  from  instabilities  of  solutions  using  the  K-Means  algorithm  depending  on 
which  of the  different  clustering  variables  had  a higher  contribution  to the  clustering  (this can  be 
read  from  the F-value, calculated  by ANOVA to estimate  how strongly  each  variable  contributes  to 
the classification). Giving higher  priority  to a certain  variable  cannot  be forced  in a cluster  analysis  
(unless  variables  are given  different  weights), but  we considered  the  F-values  in the  choice of the  
number   of   clusters   in   the   way   that   the   “difference”   and   the   “ratio”   should   have   a   higher  
contribution  to the classification  than  “coefficient  of variation”.
12  Clusters  are  „completely  homogenous“  according  to  the  criteria  that  variance  within  clusters  
should  be smaller  than  variance  between  clusters  for every single variable [2] except  for cluster  3 of 
the  “small exporters”,  which  has  a high  variance  for  the  variable  “coefficient  of variation”. Again, 






countries  Countries 
1  18  Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Dominica, Gambia, Guinea, Guyana, Indonesia, 
Islamic Rep. of Iran, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent/Grenadines, Sri Lanka,  Venezuela,  
 2  7  French Polynesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uganda, Zambia 
 3  4  Barbados, Mozambique, Nepal, Qatar 
 4  24  Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Fiji Islands, 
Honduras, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Sudan, Syrian 




 5  6  Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya 
10  1  Peru 





30  3  Chile, China, Mexico 
Outlier  100  1  Thailand 
  Source: own calculation
According  to  the  particular  characteristics  of  the  groups  which  can  be  read  from  the  
averages  of the  three  clustering  variables  in each  cluster  each  group  got a specific label 
which  is displayed  in Table  2. To  complement  the  interpretation  the  “average”  value  of 
fruit and  vegetable exports  in 2002- 2004  is displayed.  
Table 2: Cluster labels  – fruit and vegetable  exports
M ean of clustering variables D escriptive
C luster
N o.


















4 -2150 0.4 0.85 145
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6 102857 2.0 0.19 237522
10 Large exporter,
very strong w inner
Peru 1 375310 3.2 0.22 543993
20 Large exporters,
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C osta R ica,
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Thailand 1 -239517 0.8 0.19 1128955




3 1577467 1.8 0.16 3985954
a M edian
Source: own calculation
Clusters  are arranged  by the  median  of the  average  trade  value. Albeit  this  variable  was  
not   entered   in   the   clustering,   it   is   used   as   additional   information   to   describe   the  
clusters.  The  overall  growth  of agricultural  exports  was  taken  into  consideration  when  
interpreting  the  cluster.  Thus  when  comparing  the  country  ratios  to  the  ratio  of  all 
exports  of developing  countries  to the OECD, a ratio of fruit/  vegetable  exports  in 2002-
04 compared  to 1993- 95 above 1.4 indicates  an increase  of exports  above the average. 
All clusters  are discussed  in detail as follows: 
Cluster  3 (very small  exporters,  strong  losers,  instable): Cluster  3 consists  of four  very 
small  exporters   with  an  average  trade  value  of fruit/  vegetable  exports  in the  second  
period  in thousand  $ (hereafter  “average”) below 10,000  (e.g. Barbados,  Mozambique). It 
is characterized  by strong  losses  (an average  ratio  of only 0.4) and  strong  instability  of 
export  values  in the second  period.  This country  group  can clearly be labeled  as “losers”. 
Cluster  2 (very small  exporters,  strong  winners): The second  group  of seven  very small 
exporters   (including   e.g.   Uganda   and   French   Polynesia)   is   characterized   by   strong  
10relative  gains  in export  value, with  an  average  of quadrupling  the  export  value  between  
the   two   periods.   Nevertheless,   these   gains   take   place   at   a   very   low   level   which   is 
depicted   in   absolute   terms   of   “difference”.   Strongest   gains   in   export   value   were 
experienced  by French  Polynesia. 
Cluster  4 (small  exporters,  winners):  A large  group  of  24  small  to  medium  exporters  
(average  below 100,000 13, including  e.g. Bolivia and  Madagascar) is found  that  in average  
experienced  gains  in exports  above  the  benchmark  ratio  of 1.4. All countries  increased  
their exports  in this  time  span.
Cluster  1 (small and  medium  exporters,  losers): The second  large  group  of 18 countries  
is a rather  heterogeneous  group  both, in terms  of the average  of exports  and  in terms  of 
the  difference.  It is  small  to  medium  exporters  that  all faced  losses  of  their  exports  
compared  to the benchmark  ratio  of 1.4. All countries  except  Guyana  and  Mauritius  have 
a  ratio  below  0.  This  implies  not  only  relative  losses  of  the  market  share  of  these  
countries  but  even a decrease  of exports  in total values. Medium  exporters  in this  group  
(average  between  200,000  and  410,000) with  considerable  losses  of export  values  (ratio 
between  0.82  and  0.89)  are  Iran,  Indonesia  and  Panama.  Smaller  exporters  (average  
below 50,000) with losses  in this group  are Venezuela, Malaysia and  Gambia. 
Cluster  5 (medium  exporters,  winners): A small group  of six mainly  African  countries  is 
medium- sized  exporters  (average  100,000  to  400,000)  that  faced  strong  gains  in their 
export  performance.  Strongest  gains  are experienced  by Ghana  which  more  than  tripled  
its exports; other  examples  are Kenya and  Egypt.
Cluster  10 (large exporter,  very strong  winner): Peru clearly stands  apart  from  the rest  of 
the   countries   with   strong   gains   in   exports   (almost   tripled)   yet   being   the   smallest  
exporter  (average of around  550,000) of the group  of large exporters.  
Cluster  20  (large  exporters,  winners): Cluster  20  is the  largest  cluster  of the  group  of 
large exporters.  Its average  gains  in exports  are above  the  developing  countries’ average  
of 1.4. Most  successful  in terms  of “ratio”  in this  group  are  Guatemala,  Argentina  and  
Costa  Rica. At the  lower  end  (in terms  of ratio  slightly  below  1.4)) are  Morocco,  Brazil, 
and  the Philippines.  
Cluster  30 (very large  exporters,  strong  winners): This  cluster  includes  the  small  group  
of the  largest  and,  at  the  same  time,  in total  values  the  most  expanding  exporters.  It 
consists  of the three  countries  China, Mexico, and  Chile. These  countries  almost  doubled  
their exports  on a very high level. 
Cluster  100  (large  exporter,  loser): Thailand,  is the  only  large  exporter  showing  strong  
losses  on a very high level. Since it is the only large country  showing  this  tendency  it was 
found  as an outliner  and  requires  a specific analysis.
Overall, from  the  cluster  analysis  of developing  countries  according  to the  development  
of   fruit/   vegetable   exports,   it   became   evident   that   very   different   patterns   can   be 
observed.   Some   general   trends   are   (1)   all   large   countries   are   winners,   except   for 
Thailand.  (2) Within  the  group  of small and  medium  exporters  we find  a larger  group  of 
winners  (37 countries) than  of losers  (22 countries). We find  the  same  diverse  structure  
within  the  group  of the  LDCs. From  the  total  group  of 15 LDCs which  were  included  in 
the analysis  of the fruit/  vegetable  sector  5 LDC are in groups  of losers, while 10 of them  
are  found  in groups  of winners  whereof  three  even  belong  to  a group  of  very  strong  
winners.  (3) We find  rather  stable  exports  in  the  second  time  span  especially  when  
comparing  the  coefficient   of  variation  to   that  we  will  observe  in   the  meat   market. 
Principally  it  can  be  stated,  that  even  though  the  market  of  fruits  and  vegetables  is 
highly dominated  by some  major  players,  various  small countries  tend  to increase  their 
market  share  within  the  last  decade.  This  implies  that  at  least,  SPS measures  in  the  
sector  did  not  have  a negative  effect  in terms  of strengthening  the  competitiveness  of 
large producers  and  impeding  the competitiveness  of small ones. 
The  cluster  analysis  for  meat  was  performed  slightly  different.  Again,  the  group  was 
split  into  large  exporters  and  small  exporters  although  the  sample  is smaller  for  meat  
exports  (n=46) since a large proportion  of developing  countries  does  not  export  meat  to 
the  OECD at  all, or  only  in single  years.  Including  the  “coefficient  of variation”  in the  
cluster  analysis  led to rather  heterogeneous  clusters  regarding  the “ratio”. In general, the  
coefficient  of variation  in meat  exports  is much  higher  than  for fruit/  vegetable  exports  
indicating  to a higher  instability  in this  market.  To find  a clearer  pattern  of winners  and  
losers, this  variable was dropped  and  only the “difference” and  the “ratio” were used  for 
clustering.  This was  a rather  pragmatic  decision.  In the  group  of 40 small exporters,  we 
chose  a 5- cluster- solution,  the  group  of only six large exporters  was described  by three  
13 Except for Korea (285,000) and  Honduras  (340,000). 
11clusters.  Again,  all  clusters  are  homogeneous.  Cluster  memberships  are  displayed  in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Cluster membership  – meat exports
D ivi sio n
of  s a m p le
C lu ste r
n u m b e r
N o .  o f
co u n tr ie s C o u n tr ie s
1 4 C o te  d' Iv o ire , I n d ia , M a la y sia, P h ilip pi ne s
2 6 C o sta  R ic a , D o m in ic a n  R e pu bl ic , G u a te m a la , H o n du ra s,  M au ritiu s,
P a ra g u ay
3 2 R e p u bl ic  o f K o re a , Z im b a bw e
 4 4 A lge ria , F iji Isla nd s, M or o c c o, M oz a m bi qu e
S m a ll
m e a t
e x p o rte rs
5 2 4 B a h ra in ,  B an g la de sh, B e liz e , C a m e ro on , C o lo m bi a ,  D om e ni c a ,
E c u ad o r, E gy p t, E l S a lv a d or ,  In d o n e sia, I sla m ic  R e p  o f I ra n,  J o rda n ,
L e ba n on ,  N ica ra gua , N ig e r,  P a k ista n, P ana m a , P e ru,  S audi  A ra bi a ,
S y ria n  A ra b R e p ub lic , T u n isia , U ga nd a , U ni te d  A ra b  E m ira te s, B o liv a r
R e p .  of  V e ne z u e la
1 0 1 A rg e n tina
 20 3 B ra z il, C hi n a, T h a ila n d
L a rg e
m e a t
e x p o rte r s 3 0 2 C h ile ,  M exi c o
Source: own calculation
Like in the analysis  for fruits  and  vegetables  each  cluster  got, according  to the particular  
characteristics   of   the   groups   a   specific   label   which   is   displayed   in   Table   4.   To 
complement  the  interpretation  the  “average”  value  of  fruit  and  vegetable  exports  in 
2002- 2004  and  the coefficient  of variation  are also displayed. 
Table 4: Cluster labels  – meat export 
M e a n  o f c lu s te r  v a r ia b le s D e s c r ip tiv e
C lu st.
N o .
C lu ste r  la b e l E x a m p le s N o . o f
c o u n t r ie s
D iffe r e n c e
(m illio n  $ )
0 2 /0 4– 9 3 /9 5
R a tio
0 2 /0 4 /9 3 /9 5
C o e ffic ie n t
o f v a r ia tio n
0 2 /0 4
A v e r a g e
(m illio n  $ )
0 2 /0 4
5
V e ry  s m a ll e x p o rte rs ,
lo s e rs
E g y p t,
E c u a d o r
2 4  (2 1
a) -9 6
a 0 .4




S m a ll e x p o rte rs,
w in n e rs
M o ro c c o ,
A lg e ria
4 1 0 6 8 3 .0 0 . 5 8 1 7 6 8
1
S m a ll to  m e d iu m  e x p . ,
s tro n g  w in n e rs
C o te  d 'Iv o ire ,
M a la y s ia
4 2 8 4 5 7 .8 0 . 5 4 3 2 6 4
2
M e d iu m  e x p o rte rs ,
e x tre m e ly  s tro n g  lo se rs b
C o s ta  R ic a ,
P a ra g u a y 6 - 2 0 0 6 0 0 .1 0 . 7 3 4 8 9 3
3
M e d iu m  e x p o rte rs ,
e x tre m e ly  s tro n g  lo se rs b
R . o . K o re a ,
Z im b a b w e 2 - 6 6 8 3 8 0 .1 0 . 1 0 6 4 8 4
3 0
L a rg e  e x p o rte r, stro n g
w in n e r
C h ile ,
M e x ic o
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Again  clusters  are  arranged  according  the  "average".  Like  in  the  cluster  analysis  for 
fruits/   vegetables   the   variable   is   not   included   in   the   cluster   analysis   but   still   is 
important  for  the  interpretation  of the  results.  The  group  of small  exporters  includes  
one cluster  of very small exporters.  The meat  exports  of all countries  analyzed  increased  
with  a ratio  of 1.6 comparing  the  two time  spans  which  again  is taken  as the benchmark  
against  which  to label cluster  “loser” or “winner”.
Cluster   5  (very   small   exporters,   losers):   Among   the   group   of   small   meat   exporters  
(cluster  1- 5), cluster  5 is with  21 countries  the largest  cluster.  It consists  mainly of very 
small meat  exporters.  Their average  trade  value  of meat  exports  in the  second  period  in 
thousand  US$ (hereafter  “average”) is below  500  and  their  ratio  of exports  is 0.4. Thus  
the  cluster  can  be labeled  as “very small exporters,  losers”. Examples  of this  cluster  are  
Egypt and  Ecuador.  However, three  countries  do not  fit well in the cluster: Indonesia  and  
Nicaragua  with  averages  of about  25,000  and  50,000.  Both  are  rather  stagnating  with  a 
12ratio  slightly above  and  below 1. In addition,  Tunisia  with  an average  of about  3500  and  
a moderate  increase  of its exports  (ratio 1.4).14  
Cluster  4 (small  exporters,  winners):  Cluster  4 groups  four  small  meat  exporters  with  
strong  gains  in export  values. The ratio  has  a value of 3.0. Nevertheless,  their  coefficient  
of  variation  is  still  relatively  high  with  0.54.  Morocco  is  the  largest  exporter  of  this  
cluster,  the  other  countries  being very small meat  exporters.  This is also depicted  by the  
"difference"  which  has  only  an  amount  of 1054.  Examples  for  the  cluster  are  Morocco  
and  Algeria. 
Cluster  1 (Small to medium  exporters,  strong  winners): This cluster  consists  of small to 
medium  exporters  (Malaysia  being  the  largest  exporter). The cluster  is characterized  by 
an extremely  high  ratio  of 7.8, which  implies  very strong  gains  of these  countries  within  
the  last  period.  Nevertheless,  the  coefficient  of variation  is with  54  still relatively high. 
Country  examples  of the cluster  are Cote d'Ivoire and  Malaysia. 
Cluster  2 (medium  exporters,  extremely  strong  losers): Cluster  2 includes  six medium-
sized  meat  exporters,  mainly from  Middle America, that  faced  extremely  sharp  losses  of 
exports.  The group  is characterized  by a ratio of only 0.1 and  a "difference" of more  than  
- 20000. Due to the sharp  drop, in the period  2002- 2004  these  countries  are rather  small 
meat  exporters  Most stable, only halving its exports  among  this  group  is Costa  Rica. The 
other  countries  almost  completely  lost  their  share  in exports  (e.g. Honduras). The group  
is as well characterized  by a high  coefficient  of variation  (0.73). However, the  results  of 
the cluster  must  be interpreted  very carefully, since during  this period  “El Niño” strongly  
affected  central  American  countries. 
Cluster   3   (medium   exporters,   extremely   strong   losers):   the   cluster   shows   several 
similarities  to  cluster  2. It groups  the  two  countries  Rep. of Korea  and  Zimbabwe.  The 
two countries  were medium  or even large exporters  (average of about  70,000) in the first  
period,  but  exports  dropped  sharply.  The  cluster  as  well  shows  a ratio  of  0.1  and  a 
"difference"  of  nearly  - 67000.  The  coefficient  of  variation  is with  0.10  relatively  low. 
Nevertheless,   it   must   be   noted   as   well,   that   especially   Zimbabwe   went   through   a 
politically very instable  period  which  implied,  that  it had  almost  a complete  breakdown  
of its agricultural  export  structure.  
Cluster  30 (large exporters,  strong  winners): the  cluster  includes  the  two large  exporters  
Chile and  Mexico. Among  the  total  group  of large  exporters  they  are  the  smallest  ones. 
However,  the  two  countries  show  with  a ratio  of 14.1  the  strongest  gains  of the  total  
sample. With 28.0 they have a relatively low coefficient  of variation. 
Cluster  10  (large  exporter,  loser): this  cluster  includes  the  only  exception  of the  large  
country  exporters.  Argentina  is the only large country  which  shows  losses  on a very high  
level.  With  a  ratio  of  0.7  and  the  high  losses,  especially  in  absolute  terms,  as  it  is 
depicted  in the "difference" Argentina  stands  clearly apart  as a strong  looser. 
Cluster  20 (very large  exporters,  winners): Brazil, Thailand  and  China  (in this  order)  are 
the  largest  exporters.  On such  a high  level of exports  a ratio  of 1.9 implies  tremendous  
gains  in total terms.  
Overall,   from   the   cluster   analysis   of   developing   countries   according   to   their   meat  
exports  to OECD countries  the  meat  sector  is found  to be more  difficult  for developing  
countries  participation.  This  became  evident  by three  reasons:  1) the  total  number  of 
countries  which  participate  on  the  market  and  thus  have  regular  data  on  trade  flows  is 
relatively low. 2) the  market  is very much  dominated  by only six large  countries.  Except  
for  Argentina  all large  countries  even  increased  their  export  share.  3) from  a sample  of 
46   countries   30   countries   are   found   in   "loser"   clusters.   Only   8   small   to   medium  
countries  are  located  in "winner" clusters.  In the  meat  sample  only 4 countries  are  LDC 
countries.  There  from  only Mozambique  is covered  in a cluster  of very large winners.  All 
other  LDC countries  are  found  in cluster  5, the  small loser  cluster.  The tendency  of the 
sector  to  be  dominated  by very  few large  countries  seems  to  be  even  straightened  by 
higher  food  safety and  quality measures.  
What  are  finally  the  differences  between  the  two  sectors?  Table  5 depicts  in a cross-
tabulation  which  countries  are  winners  or looser  either  in one  of the  sectors  or even  in 
both.  As the  sample  of the  meat  sector  is smaller  that  of the  fruit/  vegetable  sector  the 
table includes  a raw labeled  "no cluster". 
Table   5:  Cross- tabulation   of   „losers“   and   „winners“   in   the   meat   and   the   fruit/  
vegetable  market
14 We find  these  countries  remaining  in this group  even when  going up with the number  of clusters  
up to nine clusters  (compared  to the chosen  number  of five clusters).
13No cluster
Meat loser /  winner
loser winner
Total
FV   loser   /  
winner
Loser 12 7 4 23
Winner 15 26 9 50
Total 27 33 13 73
Source: own calculation  
Only 7 countries  of the  46 countries  which  were considered  in both  cluster  analyses,  are  
losers  in both,  in the meat  and  the fruit/  vegetable  market.  Only 9 countries  are winners  
in both  markets.  30  countries  are  winner  in one  market  and  loser  in the  other  market.  
Overall  it  can  be  seen,  that  the  meat  sector  contains  more  losers  than  the  vegetable  
market.  Only 4 countries  are winners  in the  meat  market  while being  loser  in the  fruit/  
vegetable  market.  However, 26 countries  are winners  in the vegetable  market  while being 
loser  in the  meat  market.  The  cross- tabulation  depicts  nicely  the  different  structures  
and   developments   in   the   two   sectors.   While   in   the   fruit/   vegetable   sector   the  
participation  of developing  countries  or even  LDC countries  tends  to increase  and  many  
small  countries  extended  their  market  share  the  development  of the  meat  sector  tends  
to  go into  a complete  different  direction.  The  participation  of developing  countries  on 
the  market  tends  to decrease  tremendously.  Furthermore,  the  table  shows  the  tendency  
of developing  countries  to be specialised  in their  export  market.  The fact  that  out  of the  
sample  of 46 countries  only 9 countries  are winners  in both,  the fruit/  vegetable  and  the  
meat  market  underlines  this impression.  
6 Export performance and standards – some indicators?
In the  former  section  the  cluster  analysis  grouped  countries  according  to  their  export  
performance   in   the   meat   and   the   fruit/   vegetable   sector.   While   some   countries  
performed  well  and  expanded  their  exports  at  least  in  one  of  the  two  sectors  other  
countries  lost  their  market  share.  Do countries  which  perform  well rather  show  a low 
rate   of   border   rejections?   Is   higher   STDF  investment   associated   with   better   export  
performance?  Or  is  the  money  particularly  invested  in  countries  with  a weak  export  
position?  Can, at all, the number  of rejections  and  STDF be interpreted  as indicators  of a 
country’s compliance  with the importers’ demands?
First, the  results  of the  cluster  analysis  are  put  in relation  with  the  border  rejections  of 
the   EU  and   the   US.  Second,   winner   and   loser   groups   are   put   in   relation   with   the  
investment  of the  STDF. It is analyzed  whether  the  cluster  groups  show  any similarities  
within  or differences  between  clusters.
Table 6: Border detentions  of the cluster groups  in the fruit and vegetable  sector
No Cluster label Rejections  EUa Rejections  USb
N Mean Min Max N M
ean
Min Max
3 Very small exporters,  strong  losers, 
instable
4 0.50 0 1
2 Very small exporters,  strong  winners 7 4.86 0 25 4 2.5 0 5
4 Small exporters,  winners 24 9.21 0 46 13 12.3 1 34
1 Small and  medium  exporters,  losers 18 73.28 0 1
049
7 11.7 1 38
5 Medium  exporters,  winners 6 32.67 2 83 4 103.
3
4 366
10 Large exporter,  very strong  winner 1 14 - - 1 34
20 Large exporters,  winners 9 96.56 1 326 8 51.5 13 153
10
0
Large exporter,  looser 1 275 - - 1 78 - -
30 Very large exporters,  strong  winners 3 172.6
7
15 443 3 419.
0
14 886
aMean EU border  detentions  for the years  2002- 2004, bUS border  detentions  for 2005/2006
Source: own calculation,  with data  from  [14, 15, 16, 20] 
Table 6 depicts  the  mean,  minimum  and  maximum  border  rejections  for each  cluster  in 
the  fruit/  vegetable  sector.  The  table  has  to  be interpreted  carefully  since  it compares  
(due  to  data  constraints)  two  different  timeframes  of border  rejections  for  the  EU and  
the  US. Furthermore,  rejections  from  the  EU also  include  other  product  groups  than  
14fruits  and  vegetables.  Nevertheless,  rejections  on  fruits  and  vegetables  are  among  the 
most  important  components  of total  EU rejections.  Since no  other  country  specific data  
are   available   Table 6   might   at   least   give   a   rough   idea.   This   implies   two   possible  
scenarios.  First, large  exporters  might  show  higher  rejections  due  to the  larger  quantity  
exported.  Second,  larger  exporters  might  show  particularly  low rejections  since  they are 
already  well adapted  to the food  safety requirements  of their trading  partners.  
Even  though  the  picture  presented  in Table 6 is diverse,  it shows  a tendency  of large 
exporter  clusters  having  a higher  average  amount  of border  rejections.  Nevertheless,  the 
structure  within  the  groups  is  heterogeneous.  As  an  example,  cluster  30  (very  large  
exporters  and  strong  winners)  includes  two  countries  with  very  high  border  rejections  
(Mexico with  886  rejections  from  the  US and  China  with  357  rejections  form  the  US and  
443  from  the  EU) but  at the  same  time, Chile shows  only 14 border  rejections  from  the 
US and  60  from  the  EU. This  is a difference  in  the  number  of  rejections  that  can  be 
explained  neither  by  the  differences  in the  exported  quantities,  nor  by  differences  in 
export   dynamics.   Instead,   it   illustrates   very   different   export   strategies   regarding  
standards.  
As another  example,  cluster  100  depicts  the  rejections  of Thailand,  the  largest  exporter  
with  losses  in market  share  in the  fruit/  vegetable  market.  The number  of 275 rejections  
from  the EU is relatively high. However, its rejections  are only one third  those  of China’s, 
which  extended  its exports.  
Table 6 depicts  a diverse  picture  also  for small exporter  cluster  groups.  They all display 
very low rejections,  independently  of whether  they belong  to a winner  or a loser  cluster.  
The only very small  exporter  with  slightly  higher  rejection  is Nigeria  with  25 rejections  
from  the  EU. All other  exporters  of the  cluster  groups  3 and  2 note  rejections  between  
zero  and  four.  Nevertheless,  the  very low level of rejections  of these  countries  is rather  
an indicator  for their low export  orientation  than  for their good  food  safety management  
systems.  
Cluster  4 (small and  medium  exporters,  losers) shows  the largest  difference  between  the 
minimum  level of rejections  with  0 and  the maximum  level with  1049  (yet this  cluster  is 
also  the  most  heterogeneous  one  concerning  export  quantity).  This  large  amount  of 
rejections  stems  from  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran.  According  to  Henson  and  Jaffee  
(2004) most  of the  rejections  from  Iran  are  due  to  stricter  aflatoxin 15 standards  of the 
EU. Iran  experienced  strong  problems  in respecting  the  aflatoxin  level in  recent  years  
and  its exports  of edible nuts  have declined  from  some  $452  million  in 1996  to less than  
$210  million  in 2002 [9:32]. Iran  is followed  by Indonesia  with  147  EU rejections.  All other  
exporters  of the cluster  group  have very low to no rejections.  
Finally, the question  from  the beginning  of this section  whether  countries  which perform  
well on  the  export  market  have  lower  border  rejections  has  to be answered  with  no. As 
depicted  in Table 6 the picture  of border  rejections  is very heterogeneous  and  seems  not  
to   interrelate   with   an   increasing   or   decreasing   export   ratio.   However,   it   has   to   be 
admitted,  that  the  level  of  the  analysis  is  relatively  broad.  It would  consequently  be 
interesting  if there  would  be  a  correlation  between  the  export  performance  and  the 
border   rejections   on   single   product   level.   In   principle,   results   of   Table 6   can   be 
interpreted  in  two  ways,  first,  the  countries  show  a  high  level  of  border  rejections  
because  of their  high  level of export  orientation  (this would  be supported  by the  cluster  
30) and  small countries  tend  to show  little rejections  because  of their  low participation  
on the  market  and  a possible  export  concentration  on products  with  a lower  sensibility 
according  to food  safety  requirements  (this would  be supported  by cluster  3 and  2).The  
second  perspective  could  be that  some  large exporters  show  high  border  rejections  even 
though  they  have such  a strong  exporting  focus.  Examples  for large exporters  with  high  
border  rejections  are China  and  Mexico, while large exporters  with  low border  rejections  
are  e.g.  Brazil  and  Chile.  Anyhow,  border  rejections  are  always  an  indicator  for  the 
inability of a country  to comply with the importing  countries  requirements.  Thus, border  
rejections  imply  that  the  country  loses  parts  of its  export  gains  and  possibly  does  not  
exploit  its export  potential. This could  steam  from  two different  reasons.  First, countries  
with  a high  level of border  rejections  might,  although  they  have  a very  strong  export  
orientation,   show   some   weaknesses   in   their   food   safety   and   quality   management  
systems.  Second,  the  countries  might  export  products  which  faced  a particular  increase  
in food  safety  measures  within  the  last  years.  As a consequence  the  exporting  country  
has  to adopt  the new requirements.  Consequently, the country  faces  within  the period  of 
15 Mycotoxins  are toxic by- products  of mold  infestations,  affecting  as much  as a quarter  of global  
food  and  feed  crop  output.  
15compliance  higher  border  rejections.  Unfortunately,  since  very few data  is available  it is 
not  possible to analyze  country  specific data  over a certain  timeframe.  
Following,  Table 7 depicts  the  investment  of the  STDF in different  countries.  The  table  
considers,  both,  the  fruit/  vegetable  and  the  meat  cluster.  It separates  the  countries  in 
"loser  in both  commodity  groups",  "winner  in both  commodity  groups",  "winner  in one 
commodity  group",  and  "loses  in the  fruit/  vegetable  sector;  not  included  in the  meat  
sector".   Again,   emphasis   is   put   on   both,   the   differences   between   groups,   but   also  
homogeneity  within  groups.  
Table 7: Investment  of the STDF 
Loser or winner  Investment  STDF
N Mean Min. Max.
Loser in FV, not included  in meat  cluster  
analysis 12 39344286 0 371000000
Loser in both  commodity  groups 7 137902383 0 649015510
Winner  in FV, not included  in meat  cluster  
analysis 15 257078792 0 3087299085
Winner  in 1 commodity  group 30 49221982 0 410139450
Winner  in both  commodity  groups 9 60600394 270 273073960
Source: own illustration,  investment  data [19] 
Table 7 depicts  a very  heterogeneous  picture  of STDF investments  between  as  well as 
within  the  groups.  Consequently,  no  clear  order  of investment  can  be found.  The  table 
depicts,  that  those  countries  which  were winners  in the  fruit/  vegetable  market,  but  not  
included  in the  analysis  of the  meat  market  have  with  investments  of $ 257 million  in 
average  the  highest  total  amount  of  investment.  Nevertheless,  the  picture  within  the  
group  is extremely  divers.  The  high  total  amount  of  investment  of  this  group  is very 
much  determined  by the high  investments  in single countries.  Kenya e.g. received  a total 
amount  of more  than  $ 3 billion  and  thus  is an  exceptional  case  for  the  total  group  of 
developing  countries.  Within  the  group  it  is  followed  by  Nigeria  and  Zambia  which 
received  investments  of around  $ 300  million. In the  same  group  e.g. Ghana  and  Malawi 
receive amounts  between  $ 20 and  30 thousand  and  Madagascar  or Trinidad  and  Tobago  
hardly receive any investments.  
The  group  which  ranks  second  on  the  level  of  STDF investments  is, with  an  average 
amount  of $ 137 million  the  group  of countries  which  are losers  in both  sectors.  Again, 
this  value  is strongly  influenced  by single countries,  especially Iran  (that  received  about  
$  650  million)  and  Mauritius  (316)  while  Venezuela,  Panama,  Bahrain,  and  Mauritius  
received  less than  $ 25 thousand.
Third  rank  winners  in both  sectors.  Within  the  group  the  structure  is again  very divers. 
While Morocco  and  China  received  investments  of around  $ 270  million, other  countries,  
e.g. like  Brazil  or  Chile  of  Côte  d'Ivoire  received  only  around  $  20  thousand.  Similar 
situations  are found  for the three  other  groups.  
Coming  back  to  the  question  from  the  beginning  of the  section,  it can  be summarized,  
that  neither  in terms  of export  performance  nor  in terms  of export  quantity  it seems  to  
exist  a specific order  of STDF investments.  Rather,  averages  are dominated  by extremely  
high  investments  in few countries,  with  no clear  pattern  of losers  (Iran) of winners  (e.g. 
Kenya), small (Nepal) or large (China, Morocco) exporters  is prevailing. 
Overall, it must  be noted  that  none  of the  questions  of the  beginning  of the  section  was  
answered  positively.  The  two  indicators  chosen  do  not  provide  a  clear  picture  of  a 
countries  export  performance  within  a trading  environment  which  is largely determined  
by grades  and  standards.  For border  rejections  it is rather  the  case that  well performing  
countries  with  a large  export  orientation  show  particularly  high  rejections  even  though  
one  might  think  that  these  countries  are  already  very well adapted  to  the  international  
food  safety  requirements.  Nevertheless,  the  total  amount  of rejections  gives  an  idea  of 
how important  rejections  are for some  countries  and  that  large amounts  of trade  losses  
occur  because  of border  rejection.  The  STDF investment  underlines  this  finding,  since  
the  total  investment  of the  STDF in individual  countries  is tremendously  high,  taking  
into  consideration,  that  e.g. Kenya  received  around  $ 3 billion  from  the  STDF while the 
total  GNI in 2004  was  slightly  more  than  $ 14  billion  or  that  of Nepal  with  an  GNI of 
$ 6.5 billion and  with STDF investments  of nearly $ 400 million [22, 19]. 
167 Conclusions
The objective of the paper  was to shed  some  more  light  on the  question  how developing  
countries   perform  in   a  trading   environment   which  is   determined   by  the   increasing  
importance  of food  safety  and  quality  standards.  The  first  part  of the  paper  described  
the increasing  importance  of public standards  within  the trading  system.  The paper  tried  
to turn  away from  the traditional  assumption  of higher  SPS notifications  implying  higher  
barriers  of trade.  As a consequence  it had  a closer  look  on border  rejections  and  on the  
investments  of the  STDF to reflect  countries'  ability to cope  with  the  international  food  
safety  requirements.  The second  part  of the  paper  analyzed  the  export  performance  of 
73  developing  countries  and  grouped  them  accordingly  to  their  export  performance.  
Finally, US and  EU border  rejections  and  STDF investments  were related  to the  results  of 
the  cluster  analysis  to  gain  an  idea  about  the  relevance  of  standards  for  the  market  
share  development  of particular  countries. 
Overall  it can  be stated  that  the  simple  generalization  of developing  countries  being  a 
group  of losers  in these  new developments  is false. The closer  look of the analysis  of the  
paper  explored  that  developing  countries  are  a very heterogeneous  group  which  shows  
various  different  tendencies  of  market  share  development.  In  addition,  the  analysis  
showed  that  it is not  appropriate  to title small exporters  categorically as losers  and  large 
exporters  as general  winners.  Especially in the  fruit/  vegetable  sector  various  small  and  
very  small  exporting  countries   managed  to  increase   their  market   share.  The   sector  
seems  to imply the potential  to participate  in the positive market  development  for small  
and  large  exporters  alike.  Nevertheless,  it  can  be  generalized,  that  most  of  the  large 
developing   countries   exporters   extended   their   market   shares,   sometimes   even  
tremendously.  A slightly  different  picture  was found  on the  meat  market.  The five large  
exporters   extensively   increased   their   market   shares   while   many   small   and   medium  
exporting  countries  lost. However, two clusters  of small and  medium  winner  were found  
as well. 
The  analysis  of  border  rejections  from  the  US and  the  EU which  were  related  to  the 
results   of   the   cluster   analysis   of   the   fruit/   vegetable   market   in   section   6   showed  
somehow  diverse  picture.  Large  exporting  countries  tend  to  show  much  higher  border  
rejections  than  small  exporting  countries.  The  analysis  takes  only  border  rejections  of 
developing  countries  into  consideration.  However,  the  highest  rate  of border  rejections  
appears   between   OECD  countries.   This   might   on   the   one   hand   not   be   astonishing  
because  of the  larger  trade  volumes,  nevertheless,  it also  points  to  persisting  failure  to 
cope  with  international  food  safety  requirements  even  of those  countries  which  have  a 
long  exporting  tradition.  Nevertheless,  the  structure  within  clusters  is heterogeneous.  
Higher  average   rejections  of   particular   cluster  groups  are  often   determined  by  few 
countries  with high rejections.  
The  STDF investment  show  similar  findings  as  investment  structures  within  cluster  
groups  differs  tremendously.  Total  investment  of  the  STDF in  individual  countries  is 
enormous  high, while other  countries  in the same  cluster  show low or non  investment.  
Both, border  rejections  as well as STDF investments  did  not  reflect  a particular  structure  
related  to market  share  development  of individual  countries.  However, this  could  change  
in further  research  on single product  level with better  data  availability. 
Remains  the  question  what  makes  a country  being  a winner  or  a loser?  Which  specific 
characteristics  does  a country  have  to  fulfill  to  extend  its  market  shares  when  value  
chains  are  increasingly  integrated,  spot  markets  lose  relevance  and  specific food  safety  
and  quality requirements  of the different  trading  partners  are the major  determinants  in 
selling  products?  This  question  is particularly  interesting  for  small  exporting  countries  
which  managed  to extend  their  market  shares.  This very interesting  part  of the  analysis  
should  be subject  to further  research.  It would  be interesting  to analyze  the  importance  
of  FDIs for  a better  capability  to  satisfy  the  new  market  requirements.  Furthermore,  
single  country  survey  would  be interesting  to understand  the  differences  as well as the 
favoring  or impeding  factors  of the compliance  strategies  of winners  and  losers. 
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